..續本文上一頁ferent spiritual systems, nor does this imply that they are capable of being fulfilled regardless of the specific doctrine to which one subscribes or the discipline in which one trains. To show, again in an indirect manner, that the outside systems are not capable of leading to final liberation, the Buddha points out that there are two broad "families" of views, diametrically opposed to each other, under which the wide persity of speculative systems can be subsumed. These two views are called, in the sutta, the view of being (bhavaditthi) and the view of non-being (vibhavaditthi). The view of being is identical with eternalism (sassatavada), the positing of some eternal entity or spiritual principle, i.e., a substantial self or soul, as the essence of the inpidual, and the positing of an eternal entity, such as a creator God or metaphysical Absolute, as the ground or source of the objective universe. The view of non-being is identical with annihilationism (ucchedavada), the repudiation of any principle of continuity beyond death and the denial of an objective, transpersonal foundation for morality.

　　While those who adhere to the former view do concur with the Buddhists in accepting the efficacy of spiritual practice, their teachings, according to the Buddha, are not free of an erroneous grasp of actuality. They spring from a deep clinging to the notion of a permanent self, which issues in an edifice of doctrine designed to substantiate that idea and guarantee the immortality of the imagined self. Hence the Buddha traces this view to its root in the craving for being (bhavatanha), and he maintains that those who adopt such a view are for that very reason the victims, even though unwittingly, of craving and attachment. The view of non-being, on the other hand, arises from an attitude of contempt towards existence, and finds its root in the craving for non-being (vibhavatanha). The thinkers who adopt this view generally begin, as the Buddha does, by recognizing the pervasive nature of suffering; but instead of pursuing this suffering back to its true causes, they rush to an unwarranted extreme by declaring that the entire life-process comes to an absolute end with the breakup of the body at death, so that at death a being is annihilated and exists no more in any way.

　　Having isolated these two views and shown them in their mutual opposition, the Buddha then states that any "recluses or brahmans," i.e., spiritual teachers, who do not understand these views as they really are fail to measure up to the criteria of those who have achieved the final goal. They are still subject to lust, hatred and delusion, to craving and clinging, etc., and thus they cannot claim to be freed from the cycle of repeated birth and death. Only those who have comprehended these views, who see their dangers and have relinquished them, are accessible to the right view that leads beyond all erroneous extremes, and it is by the instrumentality of that view that they are capable of cutting off the defilements and arriving at release from the samsaric round.

　　Sections 9-15. Even at this point, however, the Buddha has not yet explicitly shown that liberation from cyclic existence is an exclusive prerogative of his own Dispensation. He has only left this conclusion as an inference for those who are already aware that his Dhamma makes known the middle way that transcends extremist views. In the present sequence, however, he will bring his argument to its conclusion by homing in on the crucial point that separates his own teaching from all other religious and philosophical systems. He takes up this task by way of an examination of the mental activity of clinging (upadana). He states that there are four kinds of clinging: (1) clinging to sense pleasures; (2) clinging to…

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