..续本文上一页ana has been rendered by "clinging," we have followed here a suggestion of the late Bhikkhu Ña.namoli, rendering it by "assumption" [see The Wheel No. 17: Three Cardinal Discourses of the Buddha, p. 19 (Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy)]. In this context, the word "assumption" should be understood: (1) in the sense of a supposition, (2) in the literal sense of its Latin source: adsumere, "to take up," which closely parallels the derivation of our Paali term: upa-aadaana, "taking up strongly." In this sense we have used it when translating the derivative verb upaadiyetha by "you may accept." Attavaadupaadaana is one of the four types of clinging (see Nyanatiloka”s Buddhist Dictionary), conditioned by craving (ta.nhaa). This term comprises, according to Comy, the twenty types of personality-belief (sakkaaya-di.t.thi).
Quoting this passage of our text, the Ven. Dr. Walpola Rahula remarks: "If there had been any soul-theory which the Buddha had accepted, he would certainly have explained it here, because he asked the monks to accept that soul-theory which did not produce suffering. But in the Buddha”s view, there is no such soul-theory..." (What the Buddha Taught, London, 1959; p.58).
28.Di.t.thinissaya.m nissayetha. Nissaya, lit.: support basis. Comy explains this phrase as the sixty-two false views headed by personality-belief (see DN 1, Brahmajaala Sutta). They form the theoretical or ideological basis, or support, for the various creeds and speculative doctrines derived from them. Sub-Comy: "The view itself is a support for views; because for one with incorrect conceptions, the view will serve as a prop for his firm adherence to, and the propagation of, his ideas." Alternative renderings: You may well place reliance on a view, or may derive conviction from it.
See Satipa.t.thaana Sutta where, in explanation of anissito the Comy mentions ta.nhaanissaya and di.t.thi-nissaya, "dependence on craving and views."
29.In this section, according to Comy, a "three-fold voidness is shown," i.e., referring to external possessions, self-theory and reliance on speculative views.
30.The two supplementary statements in this section suggest the following implications: The concepts of "I" and "Mine" are inseparably linked; so also, in philosophical terms, are substance and attribute. If there is personality-belief or self-theory, there will be necessarily acquisitiveness or possessiveness in some form or other; at least these views themselves will be held with strong tenacity and be regarded as an "inalienable property" (see Note 22). There is no pure, abstract self or substance without its determination, property or attribute. On the other hand, acquisitiveness and possessiveness — even if of a quite unphilosophical character — cannot be without at least a tacit assumption of a proprietary self; this applies also to materialistic doctrines (annihilationism). Since in truth and fact neither an abiding property (or attribute) can be established nor an abiding self (or substance), either of these terms is left without its essential referent. Hence the conception of inpidual immortality as formulated in the sixth ground for views, is found to be devoid of any basis and is, therefore, rejected by the Buddha as a fool”s doctrine, being outside of serious consideration.
Comy: Here a "two-fold voidness" is shown, that of self (atta) and of property (or properties) belonging to a self (attaniya).
31."He becomes disgusted" (nibbindati). Comy: he is dissatisfied, repelled. This disgust (or "turning away," revulsion; nibbidaa) signifies the stage of "insight leading to emergence" (vu.t.thaanagaamini vipassanaa; Vsm, p. 722 f.), which is the culmination of insight, immediately preceding the attainment of the supramundane path (of stream-entry, etc…
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