..續本文上一頁, and I”m not sure about the former,” and this is a serious concern for raising introspection to a scientifically rigorous status. What is required is relentless self-honesty, which may be cultivated with intensive, prolonged training in introspection. This is where the validity of introspective observations may be crosschecked with sophisticated ways of evaluating behavior and determining the neural correlates of mental states and processes. This threefold approach is precisely what William James advocated when he set forth his strategy for the scientific study of the mind.
佛洛伊德(Sigmund Freud)就無偏的觀察自己的心提出一個嚴重的擔憂：心會有有意識和無意識的沖動，有時候會形成我們並不願意承認的思想、記憶、情緒和欲望，盡管它們並不存在但我們可能把他們想象出來。人們大多知道愛因斯坦說過一句話，“只有兩種東西是無限的，宇宙和人類愚蠢，對于前者我們並不是那麼的肯定”這對于把內省提升到科學的嚴格狀態是有巨大的擔憂的。必須要做的是無情的對自己誠實，這實際需要高強度、長時間的內省訓練，這也就是需要用高級的評估行爲和確定神經與精神狀態、過程的方法來交叉驗證內省有效性的地方。這個叁段式的方法也正是詹姆斯在確定它的用科學方法研究心的時候所提倡的。
Psychologists have a lot of evidence to show that perception is a function of expectation, and introspective perception is clearly not immune to such infl uences. 8 Both sensory and introspective experiences are precognitively structured; those structures enable us to perceive things in terms of specific aspects; and those aspects are constrained by our familiarity with sets of categories that enable us, in varying degrees, to assimilate our experiences, however novel, to the familiar. Making genuine discoveries in the space of the mind by means of introspection will evidently require months or years of rigorous training, and once again, cross-checking fi ndings with behavioral and neural analyses.
心理學家有許多證據來證明感知是預期活動，內省的感知顯然無法免于這種影響。8感官的與內省的經曆都是先于認知而構成；該結構能讓我們從特定的方面理解事物；那些方面則被我們對類別集的熟悉而約束，這些類別能讓我們在不同程度上將我們的經曆——但非新奇的經曆——同化爲所熟悉的。借助于內省在心智太空中進行真正的探索顯然將需要數月或數年的嚴格訓練，並且再次，需要用行爲學的和神經系統的分析反複檢驗結果。
Subtle distinctions must also be made, for example, between imagining that one desires something and actually desiring it. Within the space of the mind, superficial appearances do not always correspond to reality, especially when they have been sifted through complex and often subliminal processes of interpretation. In addition to this pragmatic psychological question, Gilbert Ryle raises the philosophical concern about making ontological inferences about the way mind is from the way mental states seem. 9 This relates to an issue discussed in the first chapter: the fact that mental phenomena appear to bear no distinctively physical attributes at all. But if one assumes that everything that exists must be physical, then the appearances of mental phenomena must be illusory.
細微的差別也必須了知，比如想象某人想要某物與他實際需要某物之間的差別。在心智的太空中，表面的顯現並非總是與現實相符，尤其是當他們通過複雜的和常常下意識的解釋過程過濾時。除了這種實際的心理學問題，吉爾伯特Ÿ萊爾(Gilbert Ryle)産生了對以本體論推斷心智是從心理狀態顯示方式而來的哲學關注。這與第一章討論的問題相關：心理現象表現出完全不能忍受與衆不同的實體屬性的事實。但是如果假設所有存在的事物必須是實體的，那麼心理現象的表現必然是虛幻的。
This is precisely where the Baconian and Cartesian approaches to scientific inquiry perge. If we follow Bacon”s emphasis on empirical induction and apply it (as he did not) to the examination of subjective experience, we will be inclined to learn as much as possible about the mind by observing mental phenomena themselves. But if we follow Descartes” deductive, rationalistic lead as it has been adapted by scientifi c materialists, then we will focus almost entirely on the physical correlates of consciousness, while marginalizing the observation of mental phenomena. Evidently, mainstream philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience have embraced the latter option. There are strengths and weaknesses to this approach; I am suggesting that it may be well complemented, not supplanted, by the incorporation of refined introspection into the scientific study of the mind.10
這恰恰是培根學說(Baconian)與笛卡爾學說(Cartesian)的方法在科學探究中的分歧。如果我們追隨培根對經驗導向的強調並將其應用(培根沒有應用)于對主觀經驗的檢驗，我們將趨向于通過觀察心理現象本身來盡可能地研究心智。但是如果我們跟隨笛卡爾推斷的、理性…
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