..续本文上一页, and I”m not sure about the former,” and this is a serious concern for raising introspection to a scientifically rigorous status. What is required is relentless self-honesty, which may be cultivated with intensive, prolonged training in introspection. This is where the validity of introspective observations may be crosschecked with sophisticated ways of evaluating behavior and determining the neural correlates of mental states and processes. This threefold approach is precisely what William James advocated when he set forth his strategy for the scientific study of the mind.

　　佛洛伊德(Sigmund Freud)就无偏的观察自己的心提出一个严重的担忧：心会有有意识和无意识的沖动，有时候会形成我们并不愿意承认的思想、记忆、情绪和欲望，尽管它们并不存在但我们可能把他们想象出来。人们大多知道爱因斯坦说过一句话，“只有两种东西是无限的，宇宙和人类愚蠢，对于前者我们并不是那么的肯定”这对于把内省提升到科学的严格状态是有巨大的担忧的。必须要做的是无情的对自己诚实，这实际需要高强度、长时间的内省训练，这也就是需要用高级的评估行为和确定神经与精神状态、过程的方法来交叉验证内省有效性的地方。这个三段式的方法也正是詹姆斯在确定它的用科学方法研究心的时候所提倡的。

　　Psychologists have a lot of evidence to show that perception is a function of expectation, and introspective perception is clearly not immune to such infl uences. 8 Both sensory and introspective experiences are precognitively structured; those structures enable us to perceive things in terms of specific aspects; and those aspects are constrained by our familiarity with sets of categories that enable us, in varying degrees, to assimilate our experiences, however novel, to the familiar. Making genuine discoveries in the space of the mind by means of introspection will evidently require months or years of rigorous training, and once again, cross-checking fi ndings with behavioral and neural analyses.

　　心理学家有许多证据来证明感知是预期活动，内省的感知显然无法免于这种影响。8感官的与内省的经历都是先于认知而构成；该结构能让我们从特定的方面理解事物；那些方面则被我们对类别集的熟悉而约束，这些类别能让我们在不同程度上将我们的经历——但非新奇的经历——同化为所熟悉的。借助于内省在心智太空中进行真正的探索显然将需要数月或数年的严格训练，并且再次，需要用行为学的和神经系统的分析反复检验结果。

　　Subtle distinctions must also be made, for example, between imagining that one desires something and actually desiring it. Within the space of the mind, superficial appearances do not always correspond to reality, especially when they have been sifted through complex and often subliminal processes of interpretation. In addition to this pragmatic psychological question, Gilbert Ryle raises the philosophical concern about making ontological inferences about the way mind is from the way mental states seem. 9 This relates to an issue discussed in the first chapter: the fact that mental phenomena appear to bear no distinctively physical attributes at all. But if one assumes that everything that exists must be physical, then the appearances of mental phenomena must be illusory.

　　细微的差别也必须了知，比如想象某人想要某物与他实际需要某物之间的差别。在心智的太空中，表面的显现并非总是与现实相符，尤其是当他们通过复杂的和常常下意识的解释过程过滤时。除了这种实际的心理学问题，吉尔伯特Ÿ莱尔(Gilbert Ryle)产生了对以本体论推断心智是从心理状态显示方式而来的哲学关注。这与第一章讨论的问题相关：心理现象表现出完全不能忍受与众不同的实体属性的事实。但是如果假设所有存在的事物必须是实体的，那么心理现象的表现必然是虚幻的。

　　This is precisely where the Baconian and Cartesian approaches to scientific inquiry perge. If we follow Bacon”s emphasis on empirical induction and apply it (as he did not) to the examination of subjective experience, we will be inclined to learn as much as possible about the mind by observing mental phenomena themselves. But if we follow Descartes” deductive, rationalistic lead as it has been adapted by scientifi c materialists, then we will focus almost entirely on the physical correlates of consciousness, while marginalizing the observation of mental phenomena. Evidently, mainstream philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience have embraced the latter option. There are strengths and weaknesses to this approach; I am suggesting that it may be well complemented, not supplanted, by the incorporation of refined introspection into the scientific study of the mind.10

　　这恰恰是培根学说(Baconian)与笛卡尔学说(Cartesian)的方法在科学探究中的分歧。如果我们追随培根对经验导向的强调并将其应用(培根没有应用)于对主观经验的检验，我们将趋向于通过观察心理现象本身来尽可能地研究心智。但是如果我们跟随笛卡尔推断的、理性…

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